CICERO’S PRACTICAL PLATONISM: BRUTUS AS FUNERAL ORATION

William Henry Furness Altman

Resumo
Celebrado por Quintiliano como “o rival de Platão”, e embora muitas vezes negligenciado, Cícero não apenas ilumina a recepção romana de Platão, mas também um importante aspecto prático do pensamento político platônico. Usando a Oração Fúnebre de Péricles e o Discurso de Gettysburg (Lincoln) como paradigmas, o artigo argumenta a favor da origem platônica da tentativa de Cícero de persuadir filósofos como Brutus a dominarem a arte da retórica para um objetivo prático. Por meio de um elogio sobre a morte da oratória e da república que a engendrou, Cícero exorta um público contemporâneo a resistir à tirania, da mesma forma como a República de Platão tinha persuadido o seu mais inteligente leitor romano a fazê-lo.

Palavras-chave
Cícero, Platão, Brutus, Oração Fúnebre

Abstract
Celebrated by Quintilian as “Plato’s rival,” the often-neglected Cicero not only illuminates the Roman reception of Plato but an important practical aspect of Platonic political thought. Using Pericles’ Funeral Oration and the Gettysburg Address as paradigms, “Cicero’s Practical Platonism: Brutus as Funeral Oration” argues for the Platonic origin of Cicero’s attempt to persuade philosophers like Brutus to master the art of rhetoric for a practical purpose. By means of a eulogy on the death of oratory and the Republic that engendered it, Cicero exhorts a contemporary audience to resist tyranny just as Plato’s Republic had persuaded its most insightful Roman reader to do.

Keywords
Cicero, Plato, Brutus, Funeral Oration

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In his 1905 doctoral dissertation, an otherwise obscure Benedictine monk named P. Rupert Haenni compared Cicero’s dialogue Brutus to a Grabrede or Funeral Oration. Haenni used this comparison to explain Cicero’s lack of historical objectivity: he suggested that Cicero’s discourse de oratoribus revealed a marked tendency to valorize Roman orators as one might expect a Funeral Oration to pass over the flaws of the deceased. Given the understandable and characteristically modern tendency to valorize the present at the expense of the past, it is remarkable that three prominent contemporary scholars—Emanuele Narducci, John Dugan, and Alain Gowing—have recently cited this century-old comparison with warm approval. But what is more remarkable is that none of them has yet managed to apply Haenni’s insight to the Brutus as a whole, i.e., to extract its full interpretive value from this brilliant comparison. Here I will argue that the apparently disparate elements of the Brutus—an historical account of Cicero’s predecessors, a veiled attack on Julius Caesar, an exhortation to Brutus, a eulogy for the dead Hortensius, the extended stylistic critique of the so-called “Atticists,” and finally the Platonic presence—all find their place in a well-integrated whole when the Brutus is elucidated by comparison with the great Funeral Orations of Thucydides-Pericles and Abraham Lincoln. Inspired by a practical Platonism to which Cicero remains our best guide, we may yet give a neglected aspect of Greek political thought the attention it deserves and the response it demands.

The most obvious point of comparison linking the speeches of Lincoln and Pericles with Cicero’s dialogue is their immediate historical context: the classic Funeral Oration is pronounced over the war dead of an ongoing war. Apparently a mere celebration of the dead, the classic Funeral Oration is in fact a protreptic exhortation addressed to the living: “It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the  

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1 HAENNI: 1905, 52.
2 Brutus 20.
3 HAENNI: 1905, 52 (translation mine): “Cicero’s Brutus is in a certain sense the great political Grabrede upon eloquentia Romana, and, like all Grabreden, it brings into relief rather the high- than the low-points; it overlooks, amidst incense smoke and hymns of praise, the no doubt obvious errors and shortcomings.”
8 Brutus 24 (translation HENDRICKSON)：“we sat down on the lawn near the statue of Plato.”
9 For Pericles and Lincoln, see WILLS: 1992, 52-62 and 271-4. Wills effectively cites Ulrich von Möllendorff-Wilamowitz at 271 n. 25: “…the funeral of the dead gave birth to Athenian rhetoric.”
unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced.” In fact, the heart of the Funeral Oration is the interpenetration of past, present and future: it is on the basis of the glories of the past that the orator persuades the audience to commit themselves in the present to living up to—especially if that means dying for—those past glories in the future. When Pericles, for example, tells his Athenian audience to “make them your examples,” he compresses the three temporal moments of the wartime Funeral Oration into a single potent phrase: it is by continuing the fight in the future that the men of the present will show themselves worthy of their past. Given these chronological interpenetrations, Aristotle’s decision to define epideictic oratory (of which the Funeral Oration is a species) in terms of the present alone—preserving past and future for judicial and deliberative oratory respectively—initiated the ongoing process of obscuring this fundamental aspect of the classic Funeral Oration.

Cicero gives his audience several obvious reasons to think of the Brutus as a Funeral Oration: the dialogue’s somber mood, the allusions to the Civil War then raging in Africa, and the structural conceit of the death of Hortensius that joins the dialogue’s beginning with its conclusion are chief among these. On a superficial reading, then, the Brutus is a Funeral Oration for Hortensius whose good fortune in having died before the horrors of the present—embodied in the breathless but futile anticipation with which Brutus, Atticus, and Cicero await the news of the disaster at Thapsus—Cicero envies. On a deeper level, however, the death of Hortensius merely

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10 LORAUX: 2006, 145: “This amounts to exhorting the citizens to die for the city, whatever euphemisms are used to disguise the appeal.”
11 THUCYDIDES 2.43.4 (JOWETT).
12 See LORAUX: 2006, 171-7, especially 176: “…it is in this dynamism, in the exhortation of the epitaphios, that Pericles invites the living to confirm the glorious present by their future actions, so that the city may survive in all its brilliance.”
13 ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric 1.3 (1358b12-21): “The three kinds of rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time. The political orator is concerned with the future: it is about things to be done hereafter that he advises, for or against. The party in a case at law is concerned with the past; one man accuses the other, and the other defends himself, with reference to things already done. The ceremonial orator is, properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all men praise or blame in view of the state of things existing at the time though they often find it useful also to recall the past and make guesses at the future” (Rhys Roberts). Following Jacques DERRIDA (463 n. 132), LORAUX: 2006 unfortunately leaves the interplay of past, present, and future somewhat obscure (note the triad that replaces them at 174), even while discussing this passage from Aristotle (171).
14 Brutus 7-9.
15 Brutus 10 on which see DOUGLAS: 1966, 7.
16 Brutus 1-6 and 317-27.
17 DOUGLAS: 1966, x claims that “much but not all” of the Brutus was composed before “the news of Thapsus and its sequels reached Rome.” In fact the treatment of L. Manlius Torquatus (Brutus 265)
ratified his prior (and scarcely praiseworthy) withdrawal from politics and Cicero’s entire purpose in the *Brutus* is, on the contrary, to persuade his audience to carry on the fight despite the death of Cato, i.e. to show the inadequacy of Hortensius as patriot and orator. The essence of Haenni’s insight was that he realized that it was not Hortensius but something much more significant that was receiving from Cicero a Funeral Oration: it was Roman eloquence itself. The principal deficit in Haenni’s conception was that he failed to grasp that a Funeral Oration is not only concerned with the past and present but with the future as well.

Emanuele Narducci, the first to rescue Haenni’s insight from oblivion, likewise neglects the future-oriented or protreptic aspect of the *Brutus* when considered as Cicero’s Funeral Oration for Roman eloquence. He plainly sees the role of the present: Cicero’s concern for the past is inseparable from the ongoing crisis of the Republic that is the dialogue’s context. Narducci’s linkage between the present and the past is much more insightful than Haenni’s: the latter, it will be remembered, was at pains to explain the lack of historical objectivity in Cicero’s account of the past with reference to his depressed state of mind in the present. Narducci, on the other hand, begins his most detailed consideration of the *Brutus* with a reference to Hegel’s “owl of Minerva;” the present darkening sheds increased light on the past rather than distorting Cicero’s view of it. But the principal point is that Narducci takes the *Brutus* to be, first and foremost, Cicero’s view of the past: it is, after all, what he calls “the history of Roman eloquence.”

The anti-Atticist polemic in the *Brutus* is not yet the fundamental aim of the work, as it will be in *Orator* and *De optimo genere oratorum*; in his outline of the history of Roman eloquence, makes Cicero himself (intentionally) guilty of the same kind of anachronism that he later uses to prove that Curio’s memory was defective (218). See ROBINSON: 1951.


NARDUCCI: 2002a, 401: “*Brutus*, which opens with a tribute to the great orator Hortensius, now dead a few years, has from its beginning a funereal tone; the history of eloquence is also presented as a sort of ‘epitaph’ of Republican oratory.” The accompanying note cites HAENNI: 1905.

NARDUCCI: 2002a, 402: “One might say, rather, that such a passion [sc. “…for research and debate”] has been nourished precisely by the crisis of the Republic.”

NARDUCCI: 1997, 97. Hegel’s own words—from KNOX: 1942, 13—may aptly be quoted: “When philosophy paints its grey on grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy’s grey on grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dust.”

The quoted words are the subtitle of NARDUCCI: 2002a.
Cicero naturally tried to delineate the reasons for his own stylistic preferences, but what he intended to write was, first and foremost, a work of history and literary criticism.\textsuperscript{23}

Perhaps it is this conception of the \textit{Brutus} that leads Narducci to reject a crucial piece of evidence for the view that Cicero’s dark portrait of the present was not only intended to illuminate the past but also to guide his audience’s actions in the future.\textsuperscript{24}

It was J.P.V.D. Balsdon who first brought to light the hidden political message of the \textit{Brutus}: the dialogue’s eponymous hero was being exhorted to kill Caesar and thereby to prove himself worthy of his ancestors L. Junius Brutus and Servilius Ahala.\textsuperscript{25} Endorsed by A.E. Douglas in his magisterial commentary,\textsuperscript{26} this brilliant insight has now been suggestively combined with Haenni’s by John Dugan:

\begin{quote}
As a sort of \textit{laudatio funebris} delivered in honour of the death of eloquence, the \textit{Brutus} performs the memorializing and protreptic functions of the aristocracy’s funeral…Near the conclusion of the dialogue Cicero encourages Brutus to follow (precisely how he does not say) the example of his tyrannicide ancestors.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

Although it will be noted that Dugan doesn’t simply endorse a tyrannicide reading of the \textit{Brutus},\textsuperscript{28} he offers the reader not only a very plausible account of how Cicero awakens his audience’s suspicions that he is proceeding against Caesar between the lines,\textsuperscript{29} but also a brilliant new argument for Balsdon’s thesis: the passage in which Cicero personifies Roman eloquence as a woman suggests Lucretia.\textsuperscript{30} Dugan also shows how Cicero employs the argument Brutus had advanced to persuade Cicero to patiently embrace political reality to persuade Brutus to actively change that reality through word and deed.\textsuperscript{31}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{23} NARDUCCI: 2002a, 412. I have added the word “the” before “work” in order to correct a typographical error.
\bibitem{24} NARDUCCI: 1997, 99 n. 8.
\bibitem{25} BALSDON: 1958, 91.
\bibitem{26} DOUGLAS: 1966, 233: “I think that this distasteful solution is right.” See also STRASBURGER: 1990, 29-31.
\bibitem{27} DUGAN: 2005, 195.
\bibitem{28} DUGAN: 2005, 244 cites NARDUCCI: 1997, 99-101 “for a thoughtful and judicious analysis” (n. 221) of “this complex, indeed insoluble question.”
\bibitem{29} DUGAN: 2005, 175: “Atticus’ regulation of silence about politics…far from effacing politics from the text, effectively politicizes the whole of the \textit{Brutus}. The reader suspects that the work has veiled political significances which cannot be discussed openly.”
\bibitem{30} DUGAN: 2005, 245: “The \textit{Eloquentia} which Cicero has entrusted to Brutus’ care could figure as a latter-day Lucretia, both female characters whose chastity serves as a rallying point for the opposition to a tyrant.”
\bibitem{31} Although the basic insight is found at DOUGLAS: 1966, 233 (on \textit{Brutus} 332.16), DUGAN: 2005, 243-8 amplifies and explicates it.
\end{thebibliography}
Perceptive though his reading undoubtedly is, there remains a sense in which Dugan does not go far enough.\(^{32}\) When he compares the Brutus to a Funeral Oration, for example, it is clearly the traditional aristocratic laudatio funebris that he has in mind, not a speech like that of Pericles.\(^{33}\) Naturally this restriction can easily be defended on the basis of Quellenforschung but it nevertheless misses something essential about Cicero’s pedagogical intentions. In other words, by taking the comparison with a Funeral Oration literally,\(^ {34}\) Dugan fails to reap the benefits of taking it metaphorically. While it is perfectly true that both a wartime Funeral Oration and one delivered on behalf of a single Roman noble exhort the listener to emulate the example of the deceased predecessor, the Brutus is not only addressed to a single noble. Above all, a war-time Funeral Oration celebrates not only the virtues of the deceased ancestor but the cause in the service of which those virtues were exercised. It is, for example, not Cicero’s intention to celebrate L. Junius Brutus and Servilius Ahala in order to inspire Brutus to imitate them;\(^ {35}\) his intent is to celebrate the cause for which those worthies slaughtered tyrants and for which an ongoing war must now be successfully fought not only by Brutus but by all of Cicero’s readers.

Perhaps because Dugan is so intent on revealing Cicero’s proclivity to self-advertisement,\(^ {36}\) he fails to grasp that Cicero’s principal focus is actually on the distant future: Dugan’s Cicero is too short-sighted. The motive for Cicero to “linger upon” presenting himself as the teleological culmination of Roman eloquence was never strong enough to justify Dugan’s claim that “he turns his attention” away from it: it was always “the next generation of orators” for whom Cicero principally cared.\(^ {37}\) And Dugan also fails to realize that Cicero doesn’t really believe that Roman eloquence is

\(^{32}\) But see DUGAN: 2001, which will very likely become a watershed moment in the study of the interconnection between sexuality and politics in the late Republic.


\(^{34}\) LORAUx: 2006, 76-7 shows why Cicero never literally delivered a Funeral Oration: “The eulogy for soldiers who had died in battle was not a Roman custom” (76).

\(^{35}\) LORAUx: 2006, 77: “So at most the laudatio could arouse personal devotion, arouse in a young Roman seeking renown and valor a wish for personal glory similar to that of the dead man.”

\(^{36}\) This is the principal theme of DUGAN: 2005, and accounts, for example, for the remarkable way he begins his Chapter on Cicero’s Orator: “In the Orator, his final major oratorical work, Cicero seeks to control and guide his reception not as a political agent or speaker in performance, but as a textual entity” (251).

\(^{37}\) DUGAN: 2005, 250: “Cicero’s teleological model for oratory’s development…leaves Cicero at the apex of that tradition. The end of oratorical history, in its own gloomy way, assures Cicero’s position as the ultimate telos of that tradition. Cicero does not allow himself to linger upon this somber notion long, however. He turns his attention to the next generation of orators.” At LORAUx: 2006, 176 is found the felicitous phrase “the teleological temptation;” Dugan’s reading of the Brutus falls victim to it.
actually dead. How could it be while Cicero himself still lives, speaks, and writes? The
death of eloquence is merely a conceit that Cicero will use to eloquently persuade his
readers to preserve, protect, and defend that eloquence by putting it into practice in
defense of the Republic that both makes it possible and in defense of which it is most
effectively exercised. The objectives of Dugan’s Cicero in the Brutus must be more
limited: to guide the future actions of the historical Brutus. Despite the fact that these
actions were of great historical importance, the value of the Brutus does not depend
entirely on its namesake: as the Dialogus of Tacitus clearly indicates, Cicero’s Funeral
Oration for Roman eloquence was quickly recognized by posterity as having a value
that transcended its own historical circumstances. According to Dugan, however, it is
only due to Cicero’s affiliation with Brutus that this self-made man achieves anything
more than a petty if remarkably effective public relations project the success of which is
completely independent of the Republic. Dugan’s Cicero can, albeit gloomily,
contemplate “the end of oratorical history.” For a variety of reasons, the real Cicero
could do no such thing.

Dugan’s Cicero, not unlike Narducci’s, is therefore more Hegelian than Platonic
on this important point. For a Platonist, “the end of oratorical history” does not and
cannot refer to an historical moment of death and decay but rather to something more
like Aristotle’s Final Cause: it is, in other words, by no means a chronological end. As

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38 DUGAN: 2005, 250 (emphasis mine): “…Cicero seeks to undo the end to oratory that the republic’s
end has caused in a process of filiation: his political and oratorical legacy can live on in the persons
and deeds of Brutus.” The italicized words must be taken as Dugan’s strongest endorsement of
Balsdon’s insight. See also 247, where Dugan refers to “the traditional familial virtue of the Iunii Bruti
and Servilii.”


40 DUGAN: 2005, 250: “Filiation [sc. with Brutus] thus becomes a way out of the historical bind [sc. “the
end of oratorical history”] in which Cicero finds himself.”

41 DUGAN: 2005, 249: “…the end of the republic ceases to be the end of Cicero’s political legacy and
his oratorical career. Instead, the destruction of the republic takes on the role, not of the destruction
of Cicero’s legacy, but of the confirmation of that legacy.”

42 Brutus 330 as it appears at DUGAN: 2005, 249 (emphasis mine): “If the republic survives, its salvation
will attest to my policies concerning the republic; yet should it perish, likewise its destruction will
provide similar testimony.” Dugan’s Cicero is equally well prepared for both possibilities (249)
because in either case, he will have achieved his end as self-fashioned telos: “Cicero’s legacy is
assured since both the republic’s salvation and its destruction would equally be manifestations of the
validity of his own policies.” Dugan fails to realize that “Cicero’s legacy,” when validated through
failure and death, would merely have furnished posterity with the theme for some future Funeral
Oration: he would have fashioned himself as foremost among “these honored dead” from whom “we
take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion” (emphasis
mine). Needless to say, the actual Cicero’s cause is not the cause of Dugan’s Cicero: one is eternal, the
other both temporal and finite.
Cicero’s Orator will make explicit, it is neither Demosthenes nor even Cicero himself who represents the culmination of oratorical excellence: \(^{43}\) it is a Platonistic Idea.

These patterns of things are called “ideas” by Plato, that eminent master and teacher [gravissimus auctor et magister] both of style and of thought [non intelligendi solum sed etiam dicendi]; these, he says, do not “become”; they exist forever, and depend on intellect and reason; other things are in flux and do not remain long in the same state. \(^{44}\)

In addition to making it crystal clear that he regards Plato as an authority both in philosophy and rhetoric (i.e. the ars dicendi), Cicero’s decision to call the Athenian both magister and auctor is of utmost importance for understanding the nature of Cicero’s Platonism. When Plato is considered only as the gravissimus auctor, the playful pedagogy of the magister can easily be forgotten. Following Plato, Cicero recognized that a slavish adherence to the master’s auctoritas was a positive detriment to student achievement. \(^{45}\) David Sedley has ably discussed Cicero’s ability to speak both “as a New Academic” and, when “free from his Philonian hat,” to advocate a “revived doctrinal Platonism largely in terms of Plato’s auctoritas.” \(^{46}\) It is useful to think of Cicero doing the former—i.e. playing the skeptic—when imitating Plato’s technique as magister and the latter when he finally chooses to reveal the truth, as he does in the Orator. And the truth is that Plato remains Cicero’s gravissimus auctor even when—or rather, particularly when—Cicero dons “his Philonian hat” by assuming the role of skeptical magister. \(^{47}\) Cicero’s eloquent account of the death of eloquence is just as playfully Platonic as Socrates’ eloquent speech against rhetoric in the Gorgias. \(^{48}\)

It is the Platonistic element in Cicero’s thinking that guides him away from the short-term objectives of the present and it is precisely this element that allows a metaphor like “Cicero’s Funeral Oration” to capture his long-term aspirations in the

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\(^{43}\) DUGAN: 2005, 269-70 deserts the text for the sake of his thesis.

\(^{44}\) Orator 10 (HUBBELL translation modified).

\(^{45}\) de Natura Deorum 1.10 (translation RACKHAM): “Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority [auctoritas] of those who profess to teach [docere] is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question.”

\(^{46}\) SEDLEY: 1997, 118-121, and in particular 120 n. 34.

\(^{47}\) In the light of the limpid purity of Cicero’s Platonism as expressed at Orator 10-12, it is remarkable that NARDUCCI: 2002b, 431 offers the reader a rather backhanded denial that Cicero embraced the Platonic Idea. I suspect that no Platonist questions Cicero’s Platonism; others should question their motives for doing so. For an attempt to negate SEDLEY’s insight, see GÖRLER: 1995 100 n. 42; this accounts for his need to write: “apart from Scipio’s dream and its message” at 101.

\(^{48}\) de Oratore 1.47 proves that Cicero was fully aware of this Platonic playfulness.
Brutus. It must be borne in mind that the basic conceit of the wartime Funeral Oration is that the dead are not really dead: they will inevitably live on in those who continue their fight.\footnote{THUCYDIDES: 2.43.3-4 (JOWETT): “For the whole earth is the sepulcher of famous men; not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their own country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven on stone but in the hearts of men. Make them your examples...”} Justified by its past, any cause worth fighting for in the present will remain so in the future: by applying to all time, a Platonic exhortation—i.e. an exhortation oriented to the sunrise of the Platonic Idea—\emph{ipso facto} becomes timeless. It is for this reason that Cicero’s audience in the \emph{Brutus} is both Brutus and ourselves: a timeless \emph{telos} is being offered to the most distant posterity as “a possession for eternity.”\footnote{THUCYDIDES: 1.22.4}

Although he says nothing about Balsdon’s proposal that Cicero is exhorting Brutus to kill Caesar, Alain Gowing—the third contemporary scholar to revive Haenni’s comparison—brings out the Republican implications of Cicero’s Funeral Oration in his discussion of the \emph{Dialogus} of Tacitus.\footnote{GOWING: 2005, 109-120. The citation of HAENNI: 1905 is found at 119.} By the time of Tacitus, those implications have become subversive; endorsing them could get a man killed. It is perhaps inevitable that Gowing’s non-Republican reading of Tacitus—\footnote{GOWING: 2005, 109: “The \emph{Dialogus}, that is, hardly pleads for a return to the Republic, but rather offers a compelling explanation for why that is no longer necessary.”} even his Maternus, who has just forgotten himself while enacting Cato,\footnote{TACITUS: \emph{Dialogus} 2.1 (Peterson translation): “…he had thrown himself in the play heart and soul into the role of Cato, with never a thought of himself [\emph{sui oblitus tantum Catonem cogitasset}].”} is not a Republican—\footnote{GOWING: 2005, 115: “It becomes clear in the course of his concluding speech that Maternus harbors no nostalgia for the Republic.”} makes precisely the Republican element of Cicero’s \emph{Brutus} that much clearer.\footnote{GOWING: 2005, 119.} Because Gowing’s Tacitus is rejecting Cicero’s Republicanism, Gowing’s Cicero can only be understood as delivering a protreptic exhortation to restore the Republic: this constitutes the superiority of Gowing’s reading of the \emph{Brutus} to Dugan’s. It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue that Gowing is wrong about Tacitus: that his Maternus is thoroughly ironic and Tacitus himself thoroughly Ciceronian.\footnote{Following BARTSCH: 1994, 101-25, especially on “doublespeak” (115). See also MAYER: 2001, 43 n. 98.} The fact remains that Gowing’s thesis of Tacitean relativism—i.e. that what was true in Cicero’s day is inapplicable to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[49] THUCYDIDES: 2.43.3-4 (JOWETT): “For the whole earth is the sepulcher of famous men; not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their own country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven on stone but in the hearts of men. Make them your examples...”
\item[50] THUCYDIDES: 1.22.4
\item[51] GOWING: 2005, 109-120. The citation of HAENNI: 1905 is found at 119.
\item[52] GOWING: 2005, 109: “The \emph{Dialogus}, that is, hardly pleads for a return to the Republic, but rather offers a compelling explanation for why that is no longer necessary.”
\item[53] TACITUS: \emph{Dialogus} 2.1 (Peterson translation): “…he had thrown himself in the play heart and soul into the role of Cato, with never a thought of himself [\emph{sui oblitus tantum Catonem cogitasset}].”
\item[54] GOWING: 2005, 115: “It becomes clear in the course of his concluding speech that Maternus harbors no nostalgia for the Republic.”
\item[55] GOWING: 2005, 119.
\item[56] Following BARTSCH: 1994, 101-25, especially on “doublespeak” (115). See also MAYER: 2001, 43 n. 98.
\end{footnotes}
the changed circumstances of Imperial Rome—depends entirely on Cicero’s own intent in the *Brutus* being Republican, timeless, or in any case directed towards the distant future.

It is therefore not only the historical Brutus to whom the *Brutus* is addressed. Perhaps because modern readers of the *Brutus* are principally interested in Cicero’s oratory, they apply to it the same insight that has already unlocked so many of his speeches: it must have a specific purpose relevant to its particular time and circumstances. But grasping Cicero’s true intention requires the reader to recognize why Cicero included his *libri oratorii* among the catalogue of philosophical works found in *de Divinatione*. Although there has recently been a revival of interest in “Cicero the Philosopher,” and although the careful investigation of Cicero’s oratory continues to flourish, there has been little attention given to the *de Oratore*, the *Brutus*, and *Orator* as *philosophical* works. It is customary, for example, to read *de Oratore* as a defense of rhetoric from the Socratic attack depicted by Plato in the *Gorgias*; this is terribly difficult to square with Cicero’s eloquent testimonial to Plato as his principal teacher—as orator, statesman, and philosopher—in *Orator*.

Of course I’m also aware that I often seem to be saying original things when I’m saying very ancient ones (albeit having been unheard by most) and I confess myself to stand out as an orator—if that’s what I am, or in any case, whatever else it is that I am—not from the ministrations of the rhetoricians but from the open spaces of the Academy. For such is the *curricula* of many-leveled and conflicting dialogues in which the tracks of Plato have been principally impressed.

While it is widely recognized that the principal theme of the *libri oratorii* is Cicero’s ongoing insistence that the true orator must also be a philosopher, the Platonic source of Cicero’s project—despite this eloquent testimony of Plato’s pervasive influence—

57 GOWING: 2005, 120: “It is not that Tacitus erases all memory of Cicero, but he does suggest that the reasons for remembering and emulating him are no longer the same as they once were, robbing Cicero’s memory (not his work) of any real political meaning or force.”
58 *de Divinatione* 2.1-4.
60 CRAIG: 2002.
61 LONG: 1995 is an exception. Even on the social and political implications of speech, WOOD: 1988, 81-3 fails to make use of the *rhetorica*.
63 *Orator* 10: “gravissimus auctor et magister non intelligendi solum sed etiam dicendi…”
64 *Orator* 12 (translation mine). See Fantham 2004, 50 n. 2 for the translation of *sermones*.
65 MAY and WISSE: 2001, 20: “His ideal is not a rhetorician-philosopher, but an orator-philosopher.” See PLUTARCH: *Cicero* 4.1-2 and 32.5 (translation mine): “He himself, however, besought his friends not to call him “orator” but “philosopher;” for having chosen philosophy as his *métier*, he employed rhetoric as a tool for the needs of being political.”
fails to receive the attention it is due from those who are interested in either “Cicero the philosopher” or his conception of oratory.

Plato’s influence on Cicero can best be seen when this well-known fact is stated in a less customary but philosophically far more significant form: *the true philosopher must become an effective orator.*66 The *Brutus*, for example, presupposes that Brutus is already a philosopher but both *Brutus* and *Orator* (to say nothing of Shakespeare’s chilling rendition of the Funeral Oration his “Attic” Brutus delivers after the assassination of Caesar)67 prove that Brutus had much to learn from Cicero about rhetoric.68 In short, I would like to suggest that Cicero’s Funeral Oration—indeed his *libri oratorii* as a whole—is addressed primarily to philosophers and that they are being exhorted to fight an ongoing “War against Tyranny” with the weapons of effective oratory.

The reason that Haenni’s comparison of the *Brutus* to a Funeral Oration is so useful is that it applies very well to the elegiac tone of the *Brutus* and at the same time captures an essential truth about Cicero’s ongoing attempt throughout the *libri oratorii* to persuade the philosopher to master rhetoric. This theme is already visible in the youthful *de Inventione* where Cicero bases a philosophical defense of rhetoric precisely on the fact that rhetoric, as any philosopher can show, is so often abused:

> For the more shamefully an honorable and worthy profession was abused by the folly and audacity of dull-witted and unprincipled men with the direst consequences to the state, the more earnestly should the better citizens have put up a resistance to them and taken thought for the state.69

While it is certainly possible to construe this passage as a criticism of Plato,70 Cicero’s evident awareness of Plato’s playfulness on the question of rhetoric in the *Gorgias,*71 his

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66  *de Or.* 3.142-3 indicates that Cicero’s actual ideal (see previous note) is a philosopher-orator. An easily overlooked element in “the Third Wave of Paradox” in PLATO’s *Republic* is that philosophers who eschew ruling will be “compulsorily excluded” (SHOREY); see 473d3-5.

67  MARTINDALE:1990, 156 (emphasis mine): “It is more probable that he [sc. SHAKESPEARE] is here [sc. in the speech of Brutus at *Julius Caesar* III.2.13-41], *inter alia,* recreating the so-called Attic style; *he will presumably have learned at school* about the controversy between the Atticists, who aimed at controlled classical style, and their opponents the Asianists, who, as we have just observed [sc. at 155 in the case of Antony’s speech] spoke more fully and flamboyantly.” JONES: 1943 argues Shakespeare could have relied solely upon PLUTARCH. See *Brutus* 2.3 and 18; *Caesar* 67.4.

68  For the *testimonia* of the oratorical skill of the historical Brutus, see FILBEY: 1911. See also HENDRICKSON: 1906, 102-4.

69  *de Inv.* 1.5 (HUBBELL)

70  *de Inv.* 1.4 (HUBBELL): “For this reason, I think, at a later period the other worthy and honorable studies were prosecuted vigorously in quiet seclusion by the men of highest virtue and were brought to
claim that Plato was the master non intelligandi solum sed etiam dicendi, his own mastery—as a magister who conceals his auctoritas—of a fully Platonic pedagogy in which students are led to discover the truth for themselves,72 his perfectly Roman extension of the dialogue form in de Oratore,73 and his insistence that Demosthenes was Plato’s student,74 all of these point to the same place: Cicero’s hymn to Plato in the Orator was making public something that had always been true.75 In short, there is a good reason why the dialogue described in the Brutus takes place in the shadow of Plato’s statue.76 The fact that Cicero only chose to reveal his Platonism in the culminating Orator should persuade us that all of the oratorii libri deserve their place—indeed the culminating place of honor that Cicero accorded them—among his philosophica.77

In order to understand Cicero’s intentions in the Brutus and elsewhere, it is essential to grasp that “Cicero’s Funeral Oration” is little more than a well-chosen metaphor—almost certainly chosen by Cicero’s modern critics rather than by Cicero himself—for a particular instantiation of a more generic kind of protreptic oration, one that originates with Plato. In other words, in the context of his writings as a whole, Cicero’s Brutus is only another philosophical exhortation of which a Funeral Oration is, in the political context of the Roman Civil War, a particularly useful and persuasive

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71 de Oratore 1.47 (SUTTON and RACKHAM): “…what impressed me most deeply about Plato in that book [sc. the Gorgias] was, that it was when making fun of orators that he himself seemed to me to be the consummate orator.” The speaker is Crassus.

72 Cicero intentionally appears to be a Carnedean Sceptic (de Divinatione 2.150) and the neutrality of opposed arguments in utrumque partem may be said to be the exoteric teaching he embraces as magister for pedagogical purposes (de Natura Deorum 2.10). But there is also a hidden teaching (Tusculanae Disputationes 5.11 and Academica 2.60) of which Plato is the gravissimus auctor. (1) Cicero the man (ad Atticum 2.3), (2) Cicero the philosopher (by staging the conflict between e.g. Antonius and Crassus in de Oratore), and (3) Cicero’s Crassus (de Oratore 3.107), all regard ancipites disputations as merely preliminary to principled action.


74 This connection—“as consistently denied by modern scholars as it is asserted by ancient sources” is the apt phrase of DOUGLAS: 1966, 100—appears at Brutus 121, as well as de Oratore 1.89 and Orator 15.

75 NARDUCCI: 2002b, 428 rightly draws attention (despite the misprint) to ad Fam. 6.18.4.

76 Brutus 24 on which see DOUGLAS: 1966, 16-7. I would add that Plato, while present, is symbolically rendered mute in the Brutus and is only restored to volubility in Orator.

77 de Div. 4 (FALCONER): “Inasmuch as Aristotle and Theophrastus, too, both of whom were celebrated for their keenness of intellect [cum subtilitate] and particularly for their copiousness of speech, have joined rhetoric with philosophy [cum philosophia dicendi etiam praecepta coniuxerint], it seems proper also to put my rhetorical books [oratorii libri] in the same category [in eundum librorum numerum]; hence we shall include the three volumes On Oratory the fourth entitled Brutus, and the fifth called The Orator.” The omission of Plato as an “authority” requires the reader to realize that even here Cicero himself is writing cum subtilitate.
species. But even Cicero’s ongoing project in the *oratorii libri* to persuade philosophers to become persuasive is itself merely a species of the Platonic exemplar to which Cicero himself comes closest (not surprisingly) in his *de Republica*.

In “the Dream of Scipio” with which Cicero concluded his own *Republic*, Africanus is transported into the high heavens where he hears distinctly what he has been unable to hear for his whole life: “the Music of the Spheres.” Dazzled by its beauty and the simultaneous revelation of the Earth’s insignificance—to say nothing of Rome’s—he naturally has no desire to depart. It is amazing that critics always mention the parallel to the Myth of Er and not the Allegory of the Cave when interpreting this passage:78 this speaks volumes about our misunderstanding of Platonism both in its Platonic and Ciceronian form and justifies a re-examination of Greek Political Thought on the basis of Cicero.

In Cicero’s version of the Cave allegory, it is Scipio’s grandfather (rather than Socrates) who tells Scipio (rather than the Guardians) that he has a job to do down below and offers him a beautiful incentive to do it:

But in order that you, Africanus, will be more keen to guard the Republic, consider this: for all of those who’ve preserved, aided, and improved their native land, certain is their special place in heaven, where they will—supremely happy—enjoy eternity forever. For there is nothing more delightful—at least regarding what transpires on the Earth—to that Highest God who rules the Entire Universe than the legislatures and assemblies of men conjoined by law which are called ‘polities’ or ‘States.’ And of these, those who are the steersmen and preservers—having departed from this place—return to it once again.79

In the classic wartime Funeral Oration, the auditor is persuaded to die for the sake of that for which the dead have died so that, in Lincoln’s words, “these dead shall not have died in vain.” But life and death are necessarily inverted in the Platonic cosmos of Scipio’s Dream: Cicero’s Scipio discovers that terrestrial life in Rome is death and that a continued sojourn among the *concentus*80 of the celestial spheres is the only life worth living: for a Platonist, life in the body is death and the emancipation of the soul is eternal life.81 In short, Scipio’s return to life in Rome really represents a willingness to die while his death will bring him back to eternal life amidst the Music of the Spheres.

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79 *de Rep.* 6.13 (translation mine).
80 *de Rep.* 6. 18. Compare *consensus doctrinarum concentusque* (*de Oratore* 3.21; cf. *de Natura Deorum* 1.9), and perhaps even the *concordia ordinum*.
81 *de Rep.* 6.14 (KEYES): “Surely all those who are alive,” he [sc. the grandfather of Africanus] said, “who have escaped from the bondage of the body as from a prison; but that life of yours, which men so call, is really death.”
It will be noted that this constitutes the essence of the classic Funeral Oration, now properly Platonized. By celebrating a dying Republic that will therefore live forever, the Brutus, although closer to the things of this world, is ultimately no less a species of this Platonic philosophical exhortation.

In the admittedly well-concealed Platonic archetype of Cicero’s Funeral Oration, the philosopher is exhorted to return to the Cave in order to do battle with Thrasydachus. In conjunction with his life as a whole, Cicero’s “Dream of Scipio” reveals that he is the one of the very few to have perceived, let alone responded to, Plato’s actual intentions. As the de Divinatione catalogue suggests, the libri oratorii constitute the culmination Cicero’s philosophical encyclopedia once the reader becomes aware of the identity between what Cicero called “Oratory” and what Plato allegorized as “Going Back Down into the Cave.” Cicero’s Platonism not only led him to put Platonism into practice while alive but to flesh out Plato’s pedagogical metaphor by precept in the books he knew would survive his death. To put it simply: entering politics “in the sewer of Romulus” for the sake of the Republic requires the philosophical warrior to master the art of rhetoric. The immortal Cicero’s living legacy is to have left such a warrior all the tools needed to achieve precisely this important result. This is the meaning of Cicero’s life. His death, like that of the Republic for which he stands, has down through the centuries been the theme of this most eloquent Republican’s most comprehensive, compelling, and (as Dugan would have it) self-fashioned Funeral Oration. And so it happens that Cicero’s “practical Platonism” is found in his libri oratorii: the politically active philosopher must learn to use rhetoric in ways that Plato didn’t and couldn’t.

But even if Cicero did what Plato couldn’t, it is crucial to realize that he did so and could have done so only as a Platonist. More than Aristotle or Speusippus, Cicero is Plato’s best student: he teaches us what Plato really taught. The resemblances between Cicero and Demosthenes, combined with the fact that Cicero unquestionably was, should incline us to rethink the modern dogma that Demosthenes wasn’t Plato’s student

82 I have developed this reading in ALTMAN, 2012.
84 ad Atticum 2.1.8 (translation mine): “You don’t love our Cato any more than I do, but even so: by exercising his unparalleled spirit and unsurpassed loyalty, he not infrequently damages the Republic: for he speaks his opinion as if living in the Polity of Plato and not in the shit-hole of Romulus” (translation mine). This passage should not be taken as a compliment to Cato’s perspicacity as a Platonist: Cato’s decision to hear the Phaedo before committing suicide (PLUTARCH: Cato 68.2) is a high compliment to the son of Ariston, although it is perhaps not unduly uncharitable to point out that the Phaedo contains history’s first condemnation of suicide (61e5-62c8).
even if the Letters of Demosthenes are forgeries.\textsuperscript{85} In short, when we reject Cicero’s testimony about Plato’s influence on Demosthenes, and then proceed to interpret the Dream of Scipio solely in relation to the cosmological elements in the Myth of Er,\textsuperscript{86} we inevitably lose sight not only of what Plato can teach us about Cicero but, more importantly, of what Cicero was trying to teach us about Plato.

Cicero did his best: he taught his practical Platonism both to Brutus and to us. Even if Plato had been shortsighted enough to think that his exhortation applied only to Greeks, Cicero’s own case would have proved to Cicero that this kind of shortsightedness was an error. In fact, it is not from short-sightedness that these men suffered: those who return to the Cave will inevitably make fools of themselves—as both Plato and Cicero doubtless did in the course of their political activities—because they are far-sighted and therefore cannot see what’s under their own noses. But there are compensations for such folly.\textsuperscript{87} Cicero intended his ongoing attempt to persuade his audience to speak more persuasively to be received by the most distant future: an abiding concern for the eternal truth—a telos that transcends time—inevitably promotes the longer view. The writings of both Plato and Cicero would live on and survive the wreck of their respective cities as they were intended to do, having been written (to use Mary Renault’s telling phrase) “in the last of the wine.”\textsuperscript{88}

Cicero had realized from the start that eloquence could and would be held responsible for the wreck of Athens and therefore of the Republic;\textsuperscript{89} he used his own to ensure that this misconception would not go unchallenged. Every single Greek and Roman orator mentioned in the Brutus, no matter how obscure, bears eloquent witness between the lines to the twinborn truth: eloquence cannot exist without liberty any more than liberty can be retained without eloquence. It was Cicero’s preservation of this insight that ensured that the Republic (along with its most eloquent and least obscure

\textsuperscript{85} GOLDS\textsuperscript{85}T\textsuperscript{85}EIN: 1968, 261-2.

\textsuperscript{86} Note Scipio’s Socratic rejection of concern with celestial phenomena at de Rep. 1.15.3 After A.D. 1820, there was really no excuse to persist in viewing the Somnium primarily in relation to the cosmological myth of Er. But see ZETZEL: 1995, 15 (“…for C. in the Somnium, geography and astronomy are crucial…”) and 224 (...C. makes considerable effort to lend verisimilitude to the Somnium”).

\textsuperscript{87} SHAKESPEARE caught exactly the right accent when his Cassius, after assassinating the Republic’s assassin, asks: “How many ages hence/Shall this our lofty scene be acted over,/In states unborn, and accents yet unknown” (Julius Caesar III.i.111-3).

\textsuperscript{88} RENAULT: 1956.

\textsuperscript{89} de Inv. 4 (HUB\textsuperscript{89}BELL): “These events brought eloquence into such odium and unpopularity that men of the greatest talent left a life of strife and tumult for some quiet pursuit, as sailors seek refuge in a port from a raging storm.” Compare PLATO: Rep. VI. 497a3.
defender) would never die. Both Athenian Democracy and the Roman Republic have received their just share of Funeral Orations—none more poignant than Cicero’s elegiac little Brutus—and therefore their influence survives down to this day. To be sure it is a telling sign of the weakness of our own Republic—to say nothing of our own ingratitude⁹⁰—that we pay such scant regard to Cicero’s role in having kept Republicanism alive during the long, dark night initiated by the Caesars. But if it is the tragic truth that as long as there are democratic cities there will either be external threats from a Philip or domestic ones from a born-again Caesar, it is no less true that those cities will preserve their freedom as long as there lives a Ciceronian Platonist committed to meeting those threats with the eloquence that only a good cause can engender in the good.

⁹⁰ *de Officiis* 2.63: “Omnes enim immemorem beneficii oderunt…”
WORKS CITED:


